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Introduction 
A great deal has been written about cities and power, much of it concerned to trace 
who gets to exercise power over whom, and who loses out at the expense of others. The 
ability of certain groups to bend or influence the will of others has long been a 
characteristic feature of city politics. When the focus broadens to the wider networks of 
power within which cities themselves are embedded much the same refrain about which 
cities are more powerful than others almost invariably comes to the fore. From the 
moment that John Friedmann penned his path breaking paper on world city hierarchies in 
1986, the focus of attention has largely been upon the different resources and capabilities 
which are thought to lie behind the power and influence of cities. The manner in which 
global cities, most notably New York, London and Tokyo, but also Hong Kong, Paris, 
Singapore and Chicago, are said to intensify their power through an ability to settle the 
flows that matter most to them, however provisionally, has become something of a 
preoccupation among city policy analysts and urban scholars. A concern that has now 
gone well beyond the usual list of dominant cities to include gateway as well as other less 
commanding cities in the beleaguered quest to be more like the ‘successful’ cities 
(Gritsai, 1997; Kratke, 1999, 2001; Hill and Kim, 2000; Rossi and Taylor, 2006; Skeldon, 
1997). 
What has changed since Friedmann’s day is the concern to unravel the complex of 
networks through which cities sustain, enhance, or lose their ability to influence and 
control what happens around them (Alderson and Beckfield, 2004; Beaverstock et al, 
1999, 2000; Carroll, 2007; Neal, 2008; Smith and Timberlake, 1993, 1995, 2001, 2002; 
Taylor 2001, 2004). The introduction of networks into the urban equation complicated 
what was initially little more than an attempt to calculate the stock of resources at a city’s 
disposal. Once networks entered the picture a different kind of stocktaking evolved; one 
concerned to chart the network of connections, ties, and flows which seemingly underpin 
a city’s power and leverage (Taylor et al, 2002; Thompson, 2003). Seemingly, because, 
where power is located in city networks is altogether more uncertain than simply pointing 
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to such urban assets as the stock of professional service firms, corporate HQs, cultural 
capital, or strategic decision makers inside a city’s boundaries. The dynamic nature of 
networks, their frequently shifting pattern of relationships, together with the varied extent 
of their reach, makes the city-ness of power a difficult phenomenon to pin down. Do 
cities ‘run’ the networks through their concentration of resources or do networks 
themselves ‘generate’ cities as sites of power? As with most simple binary-type 
questions, the answer is rarely definitive or clear cut, but the mere fact of having to pose 
such a question points to power’s spatial ambiguity in city networks. 
But if the foregrounding of networks in city studies, especially global city studies, 
introduced an element of uncertainty into the location of power and its assets, one 
constant remains that of our understanding of power itself. There is a certain confidence 
that although power may not quite be something that a city possesses or holds ‘in 
reserve’, so to speak, the right mix of people and resources can give some cities an 
advantage over others (Allen, 1999). And if some cities are more or less powerful, it 
follows that it is possible to rank them in a way that displays the difference in resources 
and abilities. Those cities that are more dominant in their networks of influence, more 
competitive or more connected, are able to enjoy their advantage at the expense of other 
cities less well endowed economically, politically or culturally. Not everywhere can be 
like New York or Paris, and so, on this understanding it is easy to make the assumption 
that there is only so much power and influence to go around. 
In this paper, I want to argue against this zero-sum understanding of power which 
informs, often in an understated way, much of the global cities literature and beyond. As I 
see it, much of what goes on in city networks has less to do with the power of some cities 
to dominate others and rather more to do with the power exercised to hold the networks 
together, to forge the connections and to bridge the gaps. Without wishing to overstate the 
case, it is more about the power to ‘run’ the networks, to exercise power with rather than 
over others, than it is about domination and control. This may sound extreme, but in 
many respects it is not, precisely because, as I hope to show, powerful cities can dominate 
city networks without necessarily dominating at another city’s expense. And, equally 
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significant to bear in mind, whilst power can be made to ‘work’ for cities in a 
collaborative rather than a competitive manner, that does not preclude the possibility of 
some networked cities benefitting at the expense of others outside or disconnected from 
the key networks. In such instances, the ‘power to’ hold things together folds over into 
the ‘power over’ others. 
In what follows, I first outline what I understand to be the spatial ambiguity of city 
power, in a context where the city-ness of power owes as much to the networked 
connections mobilized, as it does to the ability of cities to stabilize the resources which 
may flow through them. After that, I set out the differences between an instrumental and a 
facilitative understanding of power, before elaborating upon a networked account of cities 
which draws upon the latter sense of power to highlight the potential for positive-sum 
gains, and indeed negative sum gains, to be realised in powerful city networks. The cities 
of London, Frankfurt and Sydney, and their relationality, are used to illustrate the main 
points of argument. In the final section, I go on to show how the exercise of power among 
rather than over others in the networks may nonetheless still work at the expense of some 
cities and selected interests and parties. 
The city-ness of power 
If powerful cities are those which exert some kind of influence or control over what 
happens around them, then powerful city networks are what enables such cities to 
exercise those abilities. City powers, if one can put it like that, are mobilized through 
networks; it is the forms of interaction and exchange which take place through a complex 
of networks which are constitutive of a city’s powers. In cities like New York and Tokyo, 
high-level professionals working in banks, overseas finance houses, law firms, and the 
like mobilize their economic powers through the financial and business service networks; 
through the co-present interaction which enables them to shrink the space and time 
between each other and to construct closer, integrated ties and relationships. Both Saskia 
Sassen (1991, 2000) and Manuel Castells (1996, 2004), although they would express it 
somewhat differently, would have little to disagree with in this view of power in global 
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city networks. Neither would bluntly assert that power ‘belongs’ to particular cities and 
not others, nor would they consider networks as simply ‘things’ which are there to be 
tapped into by elite groupings from their respective city locations. They would, I think, 
more or less broadly agree that the networked effect of social interaction is itself 
constitutive of the power that bridges the gap between here and there (see Allen, 1999, 
2003). But that is precisely why it is not easy to say where, exactly, power is located or, 
indeed, what it amounts to. Its spatial ambiguity reflects the fact that power is a more or 
less distanciated network relationship, not merely a set of embedded capabilities or 
marshalled resources. 
If it were the latter that makes a city powerful, then it would simply be a case of 
conducting an audit of a city’s people, institutions, skills and resources, and totalling the 
resultant mix. To be fair, this would give a snapshot of the accumulated expertise and 
established connections which enable cities such as London to enjoy an enduring 
historical advantage in certain aspects of finance and business. But such an audit would 
not provide an insight into what London does with its past and present assets, what it puts 
together with them, which sustain London’s mutable position as a dominant city of global 
finance. Powerful cities like London are not powerful simply because of the size and 
magnitude of the resources at their disposal; they are powerful because of the practices 
employed by the financial and business professionals distributed in the networks that go 
through London’s financial centre (Sassen, 1991, 1998). 
Networks of power and influence are not like electrical ‘circuits’ that are simply 
switched on by fortunate cities in the right locations, nor are they conduits for the ‘flows’ 
of power. The relationships and ties which comprise the numerous networks have to be 
constructed; forged through the resources of cities and combined through the practices 
which settle and fix their influence (Amin, 2002: Amin and Thrift, 2002). This is the 
sense in which the city-ness of power is something that is produced through the actions of 
groups and individuals whose interest is that, in the case of London’s financial centre 
above, the networks of international finance have little choice other than to go through its 
financial district for certain types of trading and dealing. It is the ability of London’s 
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diverse range of financial and business specialists to produce an intense set of financial 
interactions which enables the city to form one of the key intersections of the global 
financial economy. In Michel Callon’s (1986) terms, London’s financial professionals 
have employed their resources to good effect by constructing themselves as an ‘obligatory 
passage point’, through which cross-border bank lending and foreign exchange trading, 
for instance, have to pass through. 
In Sassen’s (2006) recent work, she talks about the formation of a global network of 
financial centres of which London is but one part of a supranational electronic market 
space that enables it to operate as a distinct kind of non-geographical territory, largely 
according to its own distinctive rhythms and spatial practices. Its authority and power, in 
her eyes, comes less from the new space shrinking digital technologies of which it is a 
part and more from the ability of its financial elites to position themselves in the global 
networks in order to practice their specialized advantage. Different global cities press 
their comparative advantage in ways that reflect their accumulated expertise, but it is their 
ability to oblige, or rather compel, others to do business through them that places them at 
the key intersecting point of the networks. As networks change,as the economic 
momentum of the global economy shifts, some cities may find themselves by-passed by 
an emergent pattern of exchanges, which may leave them little choice but to broker new 
relationships or risk a loss of their power and influence. 
Hong Kong is a case in point. At the time of its re-connection in July 1997 to the 
Chinese mainland and its new-found status as a Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic of China, Richard Skeldon (1997) speculated as to the potential 
provincial status of Hong Kong once its city-based elites had busied themselves forging 
new connections from a different base. It would appear, however, that Hong Kong’s 
global city status as a ‘networked power’ has remained intact given its significance as a 
major gateway into the expanding Chinese market (Taylor, 2004). The ability of the city 
to remain an ‘obligatory passage point’ for firms wishing to do business in China, 
however, is in no small way down to the ‘work’ of the networked elites in Hong Kong to 
broker the powerful networks that comprise the Chinese government and its external 
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global partners, prospective or otherwise. Power, in that respect, to restate the point, is 
not something that circulates or flows in networks, it is an effect of the social interactions 
that hold the networks together. When the network fails, when resources are mismanaged 
or poorly used, or when  the practices employed are over-stretched or misdirected , power 
simply evaporates. 
Moreover, it is not the strength of the ties and relationships that simply binds power 
into the networks. Following Granovetter (1973), but especially Burt (1976, 1992), weak 
or indirect connections may hold more potential for constructing new network 
relationships or for making links between existing networks than strong established ties 
which have been in place over decades or longer. An over-connected view of networks 
can easily lead to the impression that cities ‘run’ the networks from their pivotal positions 
as powerful intersecting nodes. Whereas a focus on those who occupy the same positions 
across the networks of cities, but are not directly connected, reminds us that high-level 
service professionals may ‘take their networks with them’ - together, that is, with that 
effect of social interaction called power. 
Power over what exactly? 
Given the more nuanced set of observations that now inform our understanding of 
power embedded in city networks, it is perhaps all the more surprising that it has had 
little impact on how power itself is thought to operate. Even though we are now some 
way from the simple ‘command and control’ view of global cities where power is lodged 
in the HQs of multinational corporations and used to secure far flung goals, the sense in 
which some cities are more powerful than others, that they enjoy that dominance at the 
expense of more subordinate cities, is one that still largely prevails. Whether the reference 
is to the embedded nature of city power in the fast moving digitalized networks of finance 
(Sassen, 2006) or to the institutionalized power of the networked media elites in the new 
spaces of communication (Castells, 2007), domination and control remain the defining 
characteristics. There is an ingrained idea of power as an instrument of domination, a 
capacity of some resourceful mix, which the dominant cities at the centre of things deploy 
8 
to their advantage. Such advantages in themselves do not necessarily add up to a 
commanding global presence, but they do make it that much easier to rank cities in some 
kind of hierarchical order. And if those cities at the top of the hierarchy have more power, 
influence and advantage, then the others lower down the ranking, quite naturally, are 
assumed to have less (Godfrey and Zhou, 1999; Neal, 2008). A zero-sum game of power 
exists, even in hierarchical city networks. 
Hopefully, it is not necessary to rehearse in detail the reasoning by which some cities 
came to be seen to enjoy ‘power over’ others; suffice to say that Friedmann’s (1986) 
original systematization of a world city hierarchy set the tone for later thinking on city 
power and domination which informed much of the global cities literature, including both 
Sassen’s (1991) and Castells’ (1996) influential works, The Global City and The Rise of 
the Networked Society, respectively. There are, of course, significant differences in the 
treatment of global cities and their analysis between different authors, not least in their 
grasp of the formation and location of power, but the reliance upon an instrumental 
conception of power has broadly remained throughout. Peter Taylor’s (2004) more recent 
work, World City Network offers a more differentiated account of power in city networks 
based upon the geography of a city’s connectivities which enables him to distinguish 
dominant from gateway cities, but this still, to my mind, leaves intact what needs to 
questioned; namely, what do dominant cities exercise power over exactly? 
Dominant cities, it would seem, engage in domination. They make their presence felt 
at a distance by restricting the economic possibilities of others so that they have little or 
no choice but to network with them, to go through them in other words. London and New 
York, according to Taylor, stand out as global centres of domination, followed by Hong 
Kong, Paris, Tokyo, Chicago, Frankfurt and Miami on the basis of their business 
connections. Dominant they may be in terms of their pivotal position in the network of 
connections, but whether what they exercise is economic domination is more open to 
question. Another way of thinking about how power is made to work for those cities is to 
look more closely at the practices employed by their financial and business elites in 
putting the connections together (Jones, 2002, 2005; Morgan, 2001). If, as suggested 
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earlier, it is the ‘work’ of the networks which holds the connectivity in place, then this 
points to an alternative understanding of power; one based upon the ‘power to’ secure the 
networks, rather than the exercise of ‘power over’ them. 
We have already touched upon this alternative understanding of power in the account 
of ‘networked power’ above, but it is best known following the work of Talcott Parsons 
(1957, 1963), Anthony Giddens (1977, 1984), and Michael Mann (1986, 1993) as a 
facilitative notion of power, whereby power is simply a means to an end, something that 
is mobilized, in this instance, to hold the networks together. In contrast to an instrumental 
view of power, power is understood as a general facility for enabling things to happen, 
where power itself is not conceived as a resource but as something generated by the 
application of resources and skills over tracts of space and time. As a rather fluid medium 
which can expand or contract in line with the resources available, the ‘power to’ do things 
is sustained through networked interaction; it is what enables the orchestration and co-
ordination of action to take place along the length and breadth of the networks. 
For Giddens, in a world of disembedded relations and institutions, the mobilization 
and retrieval of resources over space, especially those of knowledge and information, 
represents a modern, facilitative means of securing and controlling distant outcomes. 
What Mann adds to this understanding is that the mobilization and control of resources 
actually takes place through the various networks of extensive and intensive social 
interaction. For him, networks are formed through patterns of association and interaction 
that bind people together in the pursuit of certain ends. Differences in the make-up and 
dynamism between the networks ensure that they reach out across space in different ways 
and to varying extents, but the most effective networked practices for Mann are those 
which blend different forms of organizational reach. In organizational terms, institutions 
may enhance their spatial reach through extensive and intensive networks, combining 
authoritative and diffuse techniques to achieve far flung goals. Power, in this sense, is the 
product of pooled resources which are used to fuse and modify patterns of interaction at-
a-distance. 
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In contrast to Parson’s benign view of power, both Giddens and Mann do however 
recognize that the ‘power to’ secure outcomes may be directed towards instrumental ends 
as much as mutually beneficial ends. In city networks, with the mix of economic, cultural 
and political resources giving shape to different organizational forms, power even as an 
exercise in facilitation can be about the constraint of social action as much as it is the 
enablement of it. The point, however, is that it is not always about domination and 
control. The power to broker the networks, to reach across and between them, if it is to be 
at all effective, is just as likely to entail collaboration as much as competition, negotiation 
rather than constraint. In short, power can be made to ‘work’ for cities in what amounts to 
a positive rather than a zero-sum game, where financial and business elites exercise 
power with rather than over others across the networks. On this view, there are dominant 
cities which, quite simply, cannot be defined by the practice of domination, precisely 
because what is held out in terms of positive gains is too great not to want. Inducement, 
rather than domination may open up to manipulation as the promise of network gains is 
held out for all involved. Power, here, works through quieter registers than its brash 
counterparts of command and constraint (Allen, 2003). 
Networked power 
In hierarchical city networks the impression often given is that of a series of ranked 
networks tied together, or driven by nodal cities of relative importance (Neal, 2008). 
When the emphasis moves from the net to the ‘work’ of the networks the focus shifts 
from pre-existing ties and connections to the construction of the net itself: to the mediated 
forms of interaction which effectively bridge, broker, and connect people together in 
some provisionally stable pattern of relationships. Much of the groundwork for this way 
of thinking about networks has been put in place by actor-network theory, principally the 
contributions of Bruno Latour (1987, 1999a, 1999b, 2005) and Michel Callon (1986, 
1992, 1998), together with John Law (1986a, 1986b, 1991, 1999). In their hands, 
networks are sets of associations put together by actors who are able to enrol, translate 
and channel others into networks of meaning in such a way that they extend and 
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reproduce themselves through space and time. In this kind of networked arrangement, 
well-placed individuals or groups of individuals are said to be in a position to ‘fix’ an 
overall orientation or direction which, to all concerned, appears to be indispensable and 
irreversible. 
In terms of the city networks under discussion here, it is the practices employed by 
the financial and business elites which provide the focus of inquiry. As mediators of one 
kind or another, financial analysists, fund managers, bankers, accountants, lawyers and 
consultants are arguably in a position to forge associations and to bridge connections. By 
exercising their authority among rather than over others, such mediating elites are in a 
position to draw upon organizational resources to negotiate and persuade other actors, 
some of whom they are only indirectly connected to, to pursue certain goals (Folkman et 
al, 2007; Jones, 2002). Such professional elites do not actually ‘hold’ power; rather they 
produce it through forms of association established at a distance over time and space. The 
effect, when successful, is to stabilize a pattern of relationships which enable certain city 
networks to exert their leverage through collaboration rather than simply domination. In 
this networked world of distributed authority, outcomes are held out to be positive rather 
than zero-sum. 
Positive-sum city networks 
In an era of globalization, it is commonplace in the global cities literature for 
example to point to the dominant positions of New York and London, along with that of 
Tokyo, in the global economy. The intensity of economic ties, the increased pace of 
cross-border transactions, and the magnitude of economic flows, combined with the 
global dispersal of economic activities, prompted Sassen (1991) along with others, to see 
global cities as the necessary outcome of a more complex worldwide economy. 
Developments in information and communication technologies, spurred on by the growth 
of telematics, generated a need for locations where the ‘work’ of globalization  the 
management and manipulation of dense economic interactions – could effectively be 
performed. Places like London and New York are seen to rival one another, competing 
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for advantage across different types of global financial business, with London  coming 
out on top in cross-border bank lending and foreign exchange trading and New York 
dominating in equities and investment banking (IFSL, 2007). And yet, as the same time, 
there is acknowledgement of the fact that the increased intensity is largely being driven by 
the same financial firms on both sides of the Atlantic, the top investment banks in 
particular, many of which are US - owned. Financial institutions routinely raise money in 
both places, as well as doing business out of Hong Kong or Dubai. The management of 
financial transactions, the ‘work’ of globalization, in this respect, goes on in the intra-firm 
networks that span the two cities and what is good for London is not necessarily bad for 
New York. The mutuality of the business, it would appear, can actually add resources to 
the network rather than deplete them.This is broadly the conclusion that Jonathan 
Beaverstock and his co-researchers at the Loughborough-based Globalization and World 
Cities Study Group (GaWC) came to in their in-depth comparison of London and 
Frankfurt as world cities in the first decade of the twenty first century (Beaverstock et al, 
2001; see also Beaverstock et al, 2005, Pain, 2008).  
In the early 2000s, the location of the European Central Bank in Frankfurt and the 
launch of the euro currency led a number of observers to speculate on the rivalry between 
the two cities and Frankfurt’s potential to gain at the expense of London, given the 
latter’s position outside of the European Monetary Union.Frankfurt was seen, at least in 
the financial media, as being in an economic position to ‘catch-up’ with London. On a 
range of economic indicators, however, from the turnover in foreign equities and 
derivatives to the market for fund management and foreign exchange dealing, for 
example, London at the end of the 1990s clearly ranked well above Frankfurt. The 
exception was in the international bond market, where Frankfurt’s central European role 
placed it at an advantage. Catch-up, on the basis of these financial criteria, presented itself 
as an unrealistic option. In comparison with London, however, Frankfurt’s relative 
weakness as a global financial centre obscured more than it revealed; namely, the 
networked ties and relationships which the GaWC study exposed through the increased 
interdependence of the two financial districts. In particular, the GaWC study pointed to 
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the beneficial division of labour between financial and professional service firms in the 
two cities, with London’s global business outlook enabling firms in Frankfurt to access 
global markets and the latter’s European business providing an entry point for London’s 
banks and professional services. 
London’s importance as a global capital market, its concentration of financial skills 
and expertise, was found to add to Frankfurt’s service role in the German and European 
markets, and the increased strength of Frankfurt was seen to benefit London through the 
enhanced business opportunities an expanding Europe brought. The overall growth in 
financial business, with banks and professional service firms in both cities benefitting 
from the absolute growth, reflected the degree of complementarity between them rather 
than simply a relation of competition. Mutuality, in the form of a close knit network of 
transnational interdependencies provided, as Ulrich Beck (2005) has argued, the 
framework for a plus-sum economic game to take place. Whilst Beck has a tendency to 
exaggerate the cosmopolitan quality of this increased interpenetration of domestic and 
international economic spaces (see Allen, 2009), the GaWC analysis points to the 
practices of collaboration that characterizes professionals working in banking, 
accountancy, management consultancy, advertising and legal services in the two cities. 
Indeed, Sassen, in her revised edition of The Global City (2000), explicitly 
acknowledges the formation of a cross-border culture of professionals working across the 
major financial centres, actors who share a networked proximity but not a territory as 
such. Collaboration in such instances, in the absence of straightforward competition, does 
not imply an absence of power, but rather a negotiable set of interactions where 
professional authority is exercised with not over others in any direct, hierarchical sense. 
Andrew Jones (2002, 2008) has pointed to the diffused nature of this managerial and 
professional authority across global city networks, where outcomes are negotiated and 
mediated, and power itself exhibits a certain spatial ambiguity as to its whereabouts. 
Between London and Frankfurt, the continuous interaction between firms noted by 
GaWC researchers, both intra- and inter-firm relations, and the management and 
mobilization of skills across the networks, conveys something of this diffuse quality of 
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power, where the networked ends sought can play to the advantage of all parties in a 
positive-sum outcome. 
Mediating elites 
Nothing, it should be noted, is guaranteed in such networked interactions and a 
positive outcome is predicated upon the effectiveness of the ‘work’ put into holding the 
networked arrangements together. Returns can even be negative-sum, where all parties 
lose out should the arrangements prove ineffective or the authority of one side or the 
other be misjudged. The mediated forms of interaction that brought London and Frankfurt 
into alliance, however,clearly worked to the advantage of both parties; the use of 
London’s accumulated business expertise by German firms as a platform for global 
expansion and the development of Frankfurt as a centre for German merger and 
acquisitions activity on the part of London-based firms, as highlighted by GaWC, 
represent forms of bridging that rest upon foresight, calculation and organization. 
Frankfurt law firms for instance have opened offices in London not to be part of London-
based organizations, but to gain access to global business orientated towards the German 
market which is largely inaccessible to them from within Germany. Equally, law firms in 
London have struck alliances with smaller innovative firms in Frankfurt to gain access to 
emerging markets in eastern Europe which they would have otherwise found difficult to 
enter (see also, Morgan and Quack, 2005). Both are examples of network. 
Latour (2005) in his account of such networked arrangements draws a distinction 
between mediators and intermediaries, where the former is an active force transforming 
and translating what is not connected into some form of association, while the latter 
appear to work towards stabilizing the arrangement. It is difficult to adhere to such a hard 
and fast distinction, but its analytical usefulness stems from its depiction of the different 
kinds of work involved in the act of mediation. Both types of work are required to form 
patterns of association that bind people together in the pursuit of certain ends. The ‘power 
to’ bridge what was previously separate and unconnected elements, to bring them into 
alignment, is precisely what legal professionals and other calculating elites exercise to 
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bind London and Frankfurt into a collaborative networked space. Power here, in this 
context, is sustained through networked interaction and is itself an effect generated by the 
relationships mediated through the actions of the financial and business elites. The 
different cultural and regulatory codes which have shaped business behaviour in the two 
cities, whilst still in evidence in the GaWC survey, have been partially transformed 
through the fact of connection, more so through negotiation and inducement than diktat or 
strict authority (Morgan and Quack, 2005).  
As mediators and intermediaries, professional elites such as corporate lawyers, 
accountancy partners, investment bankers, financial analysts and management consultants 
occupy positions that enable them to bridge connections in ways that traditional elites, 
such as company directors and chief executive offices, would find difficult given their 
role at the apex of hierarchies (see Savage and Williams, 2008). The conventional focus 
in elite studies which tend to stress interlocking corporate directorships or establishment 
circles based upon personal ties, common background and shared recreational interests 
(see for example, Stanworth and Giddens, 1975; Scott, 1997;) highlight institutional 
power and influence within a predominantly national context (Carroll, 2007), but that is 
rather different from the networked power under consideration here. In today’s complex, 
dispersed global economy, the application of informational resources and market 
expertise to bring people together, to manage and manipulate interactions at a distance, 
foregrounds skills that have more purchase in open, distanciated networks. The openness 
of networks, the partially formed relations that often constitute them and the ability to 
handle the everyday complexities of transnational transactions of the kind juggled 
between London and Frankfurt place a premium upon mediation that appears to be largely 
absent from ‘command and control’ structures. 
Indeed, the more extensive and dispersed the business network, the more varied the 
interests involved, the greater the number of wills to negotiate, the less likelihood there is 
of corporate HQs holding the arrangement together without the new mediating elites. 
Jones (2002) study of ‘global management’ in transnational service firms, in investment 
banking and management consultancy in particular, demonstrated the critical role of 
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distributed authority in networked organizations. The alignment of ‘local’ business 
dealings with a firm’s ‘global’ objectives, the mediating role performed by managers and 
partners across the transnational networks, highlighted the importance attached to 
business intermediaries (see also, Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2007; Morgan, and Quack, 
2005). When the ties are strong, as Granovtter (1973, 1983) reminds us, there is a 
tendency for business networks to reinforce existing patterns of behaviour rather than 
open up to new ideas and practices. Weak ties, in contrast, allow individuals to broker 
access to what is of value in other organizations, or other parts of their own organization 
that is not readily known. The emphasis is upon the diversity of contacts and connections, 
not the number as such, in so far as they add a richer mix of relationships that enable 
those involved to access different resources and information (Thompson, 2003). Rather 
than a closed inner circle of corporate elites, the loose nature of mediated couplings draws 
attention to the adaptive, flexible quality of ties among mobile contempory business and 
professional elites. 
Ronald Burt (1976, 1992) has taken Granovetter’s argument a step further by 
pointing to what the weak ties actually span; what he refers to as the ‘structural holes’ 
between networks, those spaces which in a dispersed global economy open up access to 
new resources when brokered. For Burt, the direct personal ties and connections that 
comprise most networks are of secondary importance to the position that individuals or 
organizations occupy in a network. Key mediators who occupy similar positions across a 
range of networks, based on a shared profile of ties, yet are not actually connected 
personally, are said to be structurally equivalent; that is, they ‘work’ the net in similar 
ways yet are not directly connected in their business dealings. In playing down the fact of 
connection, what such an analysis points to is the significance of those professionals who 
broker or bridge the ‘holes’ in the networks. By bringing into alignment people and 
practices previously separate, the potential for more innovative, resourceful associations 
is presumed to follow. In the shifting relations between London and Frankfurt, the 
generation of ideas and practices through the alignment of financial and professional 
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networks documented in the GaWC study supports such a view, even though it does not 
directly confirm it. 
The London-Frankfurt study highlighted the mediation of skills, knowledge and 
expertise between financial and professional service firms in the two locations and the 
brokering of previously separate relationships, but it did so on the basis of the actual 
patterning of relationships, rather than any pre-given structural equivalence. Positional 
approaches to network analysis tend to assume that a particular configuration of ties will 
lead to behavioural conformity (Saunders, 2007), which may not be a realistic 
assumption. What such approaches add, however, is an understanding that the mediations 
that matter may be performed by a loose association of professionals keen to exploit weak 
ties to gain advantage. The ability to forge associations and to broker relationships 
through collaborative efforts does not have to resemble an over-connected view of 
networks already in place; rather the ‘work’ of spanning city networks and reproducing 
them through space and time suggests a contempory elite formation based upon the power 
to hold financial and business associations together for a given outcome, the promise of 
positive sum gains (see, Savage and Williams, 2008). 
Powers of reach 
Holding the networks together, stabilizing a particular arrangement, may sound less 
of an active force than brokering new relationships, but the work of intermediation 
involves powers of reach just as vital (Allen, 2009). Mediating professionals draw upon 
organizational resources to fold in others distant in space and time by enrolling them into 
arrangements that offer the potential of gains for all involved. In the GaWC study, a mix 
of distanciated and face-to-face relations characterized the daily interactions between 
financial and business offices in London and Frankfurt, as well as the movement and 
circulation of professional staff between the two centres. The power to secure such cross-
border networks involved both the ‘lifting out’ and ‘re-embedding’ of skills and expertise 
through mediated interaction and the use of real-time technologies to create a 
simultaneous presence. In this topological setting, where physical distances are 
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themselves not an indicator of separation or proximity, networked arrangements are held 
in place through processes of inducement and negotiation, which themselves may 
transform into practices of manipulation and concealment. 
The financial and business networks that span the two cities, or any of the major 
global cities for that matter, comprise actors who are able more or less to be present in the 
here and now of networked city interaction. The lifting out of business relations from one 
context to another made possible by an extended circuit of networked actors provides a 
kind of arm’s-length reach into financial centres, whilst the ability to establish new 
instantaneous reach through a variety of telecommunication and media technologies also 
enables such actors to connect in real time (see Callon and Law, 2004; Castells, 2002; 
Jones, 2008; Licoppe, 2004; Sassen, 2006). The point is less about speed and 
hypermobility and more about the reduction of uncertainty and the leverage that co-
presence can offer when working with different professional interests and groupings (see 
also Falconbridge and Muzio, 2007). Simultaneous exchange at ever greater distances has 
nothing to do with power moving faster, it is merely a medium that enables certain 
practices and not others, such as the inducement of city-based professionals that their 
interests are best served by the stability of a given arrangement. 
On this account, the so-called ‘distant powers’ of banks and financial institutions 
based in New York and London, or Singapore or Sydney, are rarely that; rather the 
networked powers of reach practised by intermediaries enable them to make themselves 
present in a range of city spaces through distanciated and real time interactions. Sydney, 
for instance, has been characterized as a ‘switching point’ in the powerful city networks 
that connect it to the large Asian, North American and English-speaking European cities 
(Castells, 1996; Taylor, 2004). At one time, it was seen as little more than a gateway city, 
an entry point into national and regional markets, but of late the ability of its financial and 
professional elites to position themselves in global networks in order to press their 
specialized advantage has shifted its network position (Bryan, 2004; O’Neill and 
McGuirk, 2005). Effectively, Sydney has switched itself into global financial networks, 
brokering arrangements that have enabled its professional intermediaries to excel in 
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putting together new financial deals that link finance, property and securitization 
transactions across global cities. The ability to mobilize and manage funds across 
networks in this way is a form of distanciated power, where what was previously 
understood as the ‘tyranny of distance’ has been overcome by powers of reach that make 
Sydney present in the networks rather than isolated at their fringe. 
The ‘work’ involved in brokering Sydney’s role in a set of relationships that spans 
investors, banks, private equity trusts and superannuation funds from across the globe, 
finding the gaps in investment such as securitized infrastructure deals in the UK and US, 
is performed by business analysts, financial advisers and consultants employed by 
Sydney-based professional service firms (O’Neill and McGuirk, 2005; McGuirk, 2007). 
Such mediating elites do not compel others to enrol in such networked ventures, rather 
they draw private capital, the Australian and overseas governments into networks of 
meaning that reproduce themselves over space and time. The outcome of this financial 
engineering may operate in a positive-sum manner, but the financial management and 
performance benefits derived from it by the Sydney-based elites stem from their role in 
holding the loose arrangement together as a network which works to their advantage. The 
ability of such groups to ‘fix’ an overall orientation or direction to a networked 
arrangement combines both rewarding and disciplinary styles of exchange, and amounts 
to a form of networked power that owes much to recent topological shifts in the 
architecture of globalization (see Allen, 2009). 
Back to zero-sum games? 
Up to this point, the main thrust of my argument has been to outline an alternative 
understanding of power to that of the instrumental notion that prevails in much of the 
global cities literature; that is, a more facilitative account based upon the ‘power to’ 
secure networked relationships across tracts of space and time. The sense in which some 
cities can occupy a dominant position in their networked interaction without actually 
dominating other cities was a key consideration in the discussion of London, Frankfurt 
and Sydney’s networked arrangements. While the potential for positive-sum scenarios 
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was indicated in the distributed authority arrangements between London and Frankfurt’s 
financial business centres, that does not mean to say however that such arrangements 
work to the advantage of all German and UK cities. In much the same vein, Sydney’s 
mediating elites may bridge and broker relationships which turn investments from New 
York and London into profitable returns for their networked partners, but that may 
equally disadvantage other parties less well connected or placed out of reach. The point is 
not that instrumental domination and authority have been part of the equation all along, 
but that the quieter registers of power exercised by the networked elites to gain leverage 
can fold over into zero-sum games when the ‘outside’ of the networks enters the frame or 
the promised rewards accumulate to some ‘insiders’ but not others (Thompson, 2003). 
From a position within a network it is often difficult to specify its boundary limits, 
and this is perhaps more critical for city networks where a kind of singular network logic 
pervades despite the co-existence and crossovers of different kinds of networks across 
cities. In the kind of loose, transnational arrangements that Sydney’s professional elites 
mediate, unequal access to information sources can advantage some members over others, 
but this kind of asymmetric relation is a routine characteristic of networked relationships 
and is more or less coped with so long as the benefits are positive-sum. Those ‘outside’ 
the brokered financial arrangements or those partially connected may, however, lose out 
at the expense of those on the ‘inside’. In the types of securitized transactions operated 
through Sydney’s financial dealings, those relating to urban infrastructure for example, 
consumers of the services provided in water and transport for instance, may be on the 
wrong end of a redistribution that favours the consortia of private capital and finance. 
Consumers of such urban services may be positioned in a zero-sum game where they find 
themselves outside of the networked interests that ‘run’ the globally distributed utilities 
at-a-distance. In that sense, the ability to manipulate outcomes through financial 
engineering is no less an expression of power than is domination, but it rarely registers as 
such in the network literature. The joint powers of business and finance acting together 
for their mutual benefit may still work to the disadvantage of others less well positioned 
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to shift resources in their favour (Blackburn, 2006); that is, those who have to pay 
excessive road-toll fees or high utility costs 
In accounts of intermediaries brokering and bridging global networks to gain 
advantage, however, it is less particular parties or specific interests which are often 
identified as disadvantaged as it is entire financial centres or embedded service clusters. 
The financial division of labour that holds between London and Frankfurt may broadly 
work to the mutual benefit of a range of financial and business interests, but such an 
arrangement may also disadvantage Berlin’s attempts, for instance, to promote itself as a 
global city in the wake of its revived status as a capital city. 
When compared in terms of their urban assets, the percentage of highly qualified 
corporate and professional services or strategic economic functions, Berlin is clearly 
ranked below that of Frankfurt (Kratke, 2001). When thought about too in historical 
terms, Berlin experienced a loss of many of its economic capabilities as a result of the 
Cold War and the physical division of the city, with a number of firms relocating to other 
German cities, in particular Frankfurt and Munich. The location of the European Central 
Bank in Frankfurt, in that context, appears to merely confirm Berlin’s predicament as 
positioned in the financial shadow of Frankfurt and handicapped in its ability to ‘catch-
up’ in terms of the global power stakes (Kratke, 1999, 2001). But to conceive of the 
relationship between the two cities in this way is to fall back upon earlier stocktaking 
exercises in terms of the relative sum of urban assets, rather than consider the shifting 
pattern of networked interactions between Berlin and Frankfurt, now that Berlin is once 
again the capital city. In the present day German context, Frankfurt may be the dominant 
global city, but it does not follow that it dominates Berlin (see Cochrane and Jonas, 
1999). 
If we only think in terms of the ability of Frankfurt, or rather its financial and 
business elites, to impose their will over Berlin’s equivalent groupings or political elites, 
then we are likely to miss the networked power relations between them. In the types of 
interchange between the two cities, the absence of mediated forms of interaction between 
business and professional elites may be as significant as subtler forms of exclusion 
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through manipulative dealings which hold Berlin’s financial abilities and skills in its 
relatively lowly place. The polycentric nature of the German urban and regional system 
works against a winner-take-all outcome, but Berlin’s economic position ‘outside’ of 
London and Frankfurt’s networked business services leaves it disadvantaged in terms of 
the specific ties and connections which it  currently does not appear to be in a position to 
negotiate or bridge. 
For some cities which operate largely outside of the key financial and business 
connections of the global economy, or who become disconnected from them in an 
economic downturn or geopolitical realignment, the experience of losing out at the 
expense of other cities is no doubt a real one. The sense in which the constitutive 
‘outside’, where for instance it comprises many of the ‘ordinary cities’ of the less 
developed world (see Robinson, 2005, 2006), may be subject to the exploitative 
economic pressures of the major financial markets can add up to a zero-sum game. Here, 
however, it is the powerful financial city networks themselves, rather than any one 
particular city or set of cities, which has the ‘power over’ those outside of ‘mainstream’ 
business and monetary relationships. Networked economic power in that sense, which 
bypasses many of the larger yet poorer cities of the world, uses its ‘power to’ hold 
financial arrangements together precisely to exclude others from gaining economic 
advantage. That is not to designate those in such cities, including their professional elites, 
as simply powerless, but rather to recognize, as Michael P. Smith (2001) does, that cities 
draw different kinds of associational power from the variety of networks which pass 
through them. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper has been to draw attention to the fact that whilst a networked 
understanding of cities has altered how we think about cities and their relationships, it has 
done little to jar our sense of the city-ness of power. The recognition that cities cannot be 
understood apart from the networks which constitute them has been accompanied by an 
acknowledgement that powerful cities cannot be comprehended outside of the networks 
23 
which hold them together. Yet aside from disagreement, or rather confusion, over the 
actual location of that power, there has been little dispute over the nature of that power. 
Broadly speaking, the global cities literature continues to portray power as 
hierarchical rather than networked, more instrumental than facilitative, and zero-sum 
rather than open-ended in its outcomes. In so far as city networks can be a judicious mix 
of these characteristics, it is puzzling then as to why domination and subordination 
remains the key tropes when powerful city networks are under discussion. Seen from a 
different angle, one of the foremost reasons that city networks hold together is because 
they hold out the prospect of positive gains that are too great for those involved not to 
want. Inducement and incitement, as registers of power, are arguably what drives these 
networked interactions between city actors, ran alongside the possibility for manipulation 
and dissimulation which may skew the rewards more to some than others. Positive-sum 
gains do not automatically amount to equal-sum gains, and some gains may turn out to be 
illusory. 
Much of the paper has been concerned to counter a one-sided instrumental view of 
power by setting out an alternative way of thinking about how power ‘works’ for cities 
when they are networked. If cities mobilize their powers and influence through the 
networks, rather than simply ‘hold’ them in reserve as accumulated expertise, then the 
business of forging connections, brokering ties and stabilizing relationships is an 
expression of that power. To my mind, it is the ‘power to’ secure the networks over tracts 
of space and time which conveys much of what the mediating elites, the financial and 
business professionals, actually do. In many respects, the functions they perform are not 
dissimilar to Castells (2002) ‘programmers’ and ‘switchers’, in that they seek out 
connections and aim to enhance networked resources. What I stress in contrast, however, 
is the ‘work’ involved in producing the ‘power to’ hold the networked arrangements 
together, rather than power as a structural capacity which gives ‘programmers’ and 
switchers’ their respective positions in already constituted networks. Power, as a 
distanciated networked relationship, is a provisional achievement, more expedient than is 
24 
often recognized, as is surely evident in todays financially challenging times (see Allen, 
2008). 
As I see it, there is no ‘given’ backdrop of global networks through which dominant 
actors impose their will upon other more subordinate players, only different groups of 
professionals, organizations and institutions caught in spatial and temporal arrangements 
that often stabilize as city networks through an array of practices that play across one 
another. These practices may range from inducement, whereby positive-sum gains are 
held up as an incitement, and the manipulation of such outcomes, to the negotiation of 
settlements which ‘fix’ a network orientation so that those involved accept it as 
irreversible. In contrast to more strident forms of instrumental power, these quieter 
registers ‘work’ through varied powers of reach made possible by topological shifts in the 
networked architecture of globalization. Power-topologies, as such, are part of the glue 
that both makes and binds cities in complex forms of networked interaction. They are 
what enable global cities to ‘happen’ and, indeed, what potentially unravels them when 
the momentum stops and elite authority is no longer recongized. 
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